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the real cost of chiNa’s rare earth exPort 
Quotas oN americaN JoB security
by Katherine Weatherford*
The populist appeal for job creation currently domi-nating U.S. politics has spurred copious discus-sion about whether regulatory policy is responsible 
for the present economic condition.1 Although this debate cen-
ters primarily on domestic regulations, recent congressio-
nal action2 confirms reports that China’s economic policies, 
particularly its export restraints and currency manipulation, 
have not only increased the already significant trade deficit 
between the U.S. and China, but have cost approximately 2.8 
million U.S. jobs.3 Of specific concern are China’s export 
quotas on Rare Earth Minerals (“REMs”).
REMs are used in the production of virtually all technological 
goods—from cell phones to wind turbines.4 Thus, it is no surprise 
that the demand for REMs has increased exponentially over the last 
decade.5 Even though the U.S. has sufficient REM reserves to satisfy 
demand, importing REMs from China costs less than producing them 
domestically.6 And because many other nations also rely on China’s 
low–cost REMs, China has dominated the global REM market, and 
currently produces 97% of the world’s supply.7 Consequently, when 
China set export quotas on REMs, it resulted in uncertainty about 
future availability accompanied by a drastic price increase.8 
The implications of export quotas on rare earths, especially in 
light of the current economic downturn, make it evident that the U.S. 
must begin to consider feasible solutions to the REM access con-
flict.9 One option is to continue accepting REMs from China subject 
to its export quotas. Yet, choosing this option will undoubtedly force 
U.S. taxpayers to continue financing China’s REM stockpiles at the 
expense of American jobs.10 This is because product manufactur-
ers located in China can purchase REMs without the added costs 
associated with export quotas. This incents foreign manufacturers, 
including U.S.based companies, to relocate to China in pursuit of 
these cheaper REMs, and ultimately, to take U.S. manufacturing 
jobs overseas as well.11 
A second option is for the United States to file a complaint 
with the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), as it did in 2009 in 
collaboration with the European Union and Mexico.12 This 2009 
complaint asserted that China’s export quotas on raw minerals vio-
lated Article XI:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”),13 and various provisions of China’s Accession Protocol 
and China’s Working Party Report.14 China invoked GATT Article 
XX exceptions, framing its export restraints as a means to “protect 
the environment and [its] limited resources” and arguing that its 
actions advance “the sustainable development of the global econ-
omy.”15 Nevertheless, the WTO panel rejected China’s defense,16 
prompting China to file an appeal, which is currently pending.17 
In both the 2009 complaint and the current conflict over REMs, 
China disguises its economic motives by implying that export 
quotas will result in reduced production, which will help protect 
natural resources. But this is not the case if China merely supple-
ments wouldbe exports with domestic production. If China actually 
intended to protect its environment, it should have regulated its 
mining operations rather than its exports.18 Regardless of China’s 
intention, it seems futile for the United States to pursue a resolution 
through the WTO process given the failure of the 2009 consulta-
tions to produce an effective outcome thus far. 
A third option is for the U.S. to produce REMs domestically.19 
While this is technically feasible, the U.S. closed its only remaining 
rare earth mining operation in 2002 as a result of environmental 
damage and intense global competition.20 Plans are in motion to 
reopen the Molycorp, Inc. facility in Mountain Pass, California by 
2012;21 however, building new facilities will require a large invest-
ment.22 Even with domestic production, the U.S. will still need to 
send the REMs to China for alloying and manufacturing, at least 
until the technology needed to safely and economically perform 
these processes is developed.23 Although domestic production is 
likely the most sustainable mechanism to stimulate longterm job 
growth, the United States must take other steps in the interim to 
respond to China’s REM export quotas.24 
One intermediate step is to enact legislation modeled after 
the Conflict Minerals provision in § 1502 of the Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.25 That provision 
instructs the Securities and Exchange Commission to promulgate a 
rule requiring any producer who uses conflict minerals “to disclose 
in . . . its annual report whether its conflict minerals originated in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country.”26 
Just as the § 1502 reporting requirement will help to prevent human 
rights abuses in the Congo, a similar rule requiring disclosure of 
REMs originating in China would assist in combating China’s pro-
tectionist policies and lax environmental regulations.27 
Ultimately, the United States must begin evaluating legitimate 
solutions to the REM access conflict. In doing so, the U.S. must 
not act hastily, as an illconsidered solution will likely fail to focus 
on longterm sustainable development. Most importantly, in choos-
ing whether and how to pursue domestic REM production the U.S. 
must be especially attentive not to neglect environmental protection 
in favor of economic stability.28 Only by considering both domestic 
action and international diplomacy can the United States resolve the 
REM access conflict. 
* Katherine Weatherford is a J.D. candidate, May 2012, at American University 
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